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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In accordance with a motion of defendant Robert 0. 
Pusey (Robert) the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, Second Judicial 
District Court Judge in and for Davis County, State of Utah, 
entered an order removing lis pendens on September 16, 1985 
which ordered the removal of the lis pendens recorded by plain-
tiff Kathleen S. Pusey (Kathy) on real property located at 251 
Edith Avenue and 1248 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. In 
the prior appeal by Robert from the divorce decree in these 
proceedings, Case No. 20365, Kathy claims that on remand she 
may be awarded a right, title and interest in said real 
property. Kathy therefore appeals the Order Removing Lis 
Pendens and requests that the court reverse the same so that 
her lis pendens may remain as an encumbrance upon said real 
property during the pendency of these divorce proceedings, 
including all appeals, protecting her interest therein against 
the claim of good faith purchasers. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. , § 78-40-2 (1953) and the cases cited 
in appellant's brief are determinative in resolving this 
appeal. Such statutory provision provides as follows: 
In any action affecting the title to or 
the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the 
complaint or thereafter, and the defendant 
at the time of filing his answer when 
affirmative relief is claimed in such 
answer, or at any time afterward, may file 
for record with the recorder of the county 
in which the property or some part thereof 
is situated a notice of the pendency of the 
action, containing the names of the parties, 
the object of the action or defense, and the 
description of the property in that county 
affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 12, 1983, Kathy filed a Complaint for 
Divorce in the above-entitled action against Robert in the 
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of 
Utah. The Complaint requested that the Court grant Kathy a 
divorce and that the trial court make an equitable distribution 
of the assets of the parties. After conducting discovery in 
such divorce proceedings, Kathy learned that record title to 
real property owned by Robert and located at 1248 South 300 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 251 Edith Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was in the name of Robert's nominees, Fun Fair, 
Inc. and Virla 0. Woolstenhulme. Fun Fair, Inc. is a corpora-
tion owned and controlled by Robert and Mrs. Woolstenhulme, his 
mother. 
In order to put any potential good faith purchasers on 
notice of her claim of an interest in said real property, by 
way of these divorce proceedings, Kathy recorded a lis pendens 
on each parcel of real property on May 25, 1984. Each lis 
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pendens states that Kathy seeks to have a Divorce Decree 
entered in her favor against Robert, making an equitable dis-
tribution of Robert's real property located at the above 
addresses. The lis pendens further states that Pobert is the 
equitable fee owner of said real property and that the saire is 
titled in another person or entity in name only and that they 
hold the same for Robert. True and correct copies of said lis 
pendens are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B and incorpo-
rated herein by this reference. 
At the trial of this action, the Court heard testimony 
showing that Robert and Kathy lived at the home at 251 Edith 
Avenue for about four years during the marriage and made signi-
ficant repairs and improvements thereto from marital assets. 
(Tr. Vol. II at 35-37, 45 and 24-26.J1 Kathy testified that 
record title to said home was in the name of Robert's mother, 
but it was controlled and operated by Robert. (Tr. Vol. II at 
1[ 39-40.) He made all significant decisions with respect 
thereto. (I_d.) The real property owned by Fun Fairf Inc. Was 
operated as a nursery during and subsequent to the marriage. 
The tenant who operated the nursery during the marriage, and 
^References herein are to the transcript of the divorce 
trial included as part of the record in the appeal therefrom, 
presently before this Court as Civil No. 20365. 
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marriage, and who continues to operate the same, was located by 
Kathy. The tenant found by Kathy contributed significant 
income to Fun Fair during the marriage. (Tr. Vol. II 16-17 and 
42-44.) 
During the marriage, Kathy was employed by Fun Fair, 
Inc. and served as a secretary and officer of the same. (R. at 
267, If 12, Tr., Vol. II at 37, 42 and plaintiffs Exhibit 20.) 
Kathy1s expert witness at the trial testified that two-thirds 
of the value of the real property, as of the date of trial, 
located at 248 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 251 
Edith Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, was attributable to appre-
ciation during the marriage, caused by inflation. (Tr., Vol. 
II at 13-18.) 
In making an equitable distribution of the marital 
estate, the court did not award any of the appreciation in 
value of said real property to Kathy. The Court determined 
that all of the stock in Fun Fair, Inc. was owned wholly by 
Robert and his mother and that the real property located at 251 
Edith Avenue was owned wholly by Robert's mother. This was in 
spite of the fact that (1) Kathy and Robert had made signifi-
cant improvements to such real property which increased its 
value, (2) such real property was controlled and operated by 
the parties during the marriage; and (3) said real estate 
appreciated in value during that time period. In holding that 
said real property was owned by Fun Fair, Inc. and Robert's 
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mother, the Court failed to award any of its value to Kathy. 
In spite of the fact that the Court held that Robert and his 
mother owned all of the stock in Fun Fair, Inc., the Court did 
not award Kathy any interest in said stock. Instead, the Court 
awarded Kathy an interest in real property located in 
Bountiful, Utah known as the old Western General Dairy facility. 
Subsequent to entry of the Divorce Decree, Robert 
filed an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court seeking a "modifica-
tion of the property distribution to deduct the value of money 
traceable to his separate assets, with only the net value, 
i.e., the value traceable to the marriage, to be divided 
between the parties." (Appellants Brief at 2.) By the appeal, 
Robert seeks to reduce Kathy*s interest in the real property in 
the Dairy facility in Bountiful. Kathy does not contest the 
property distribution made by the lower court and feels that 
the same was fair and equitable but, Hif this case is remanded 
for a re-evaluation of the property division, it should also be 
remanded to allow Kathy an opportunity to put on evidence and 
argue that she should have received more of the value of the 
assets of the parties. Specifically, the remand should allow 
consideration of awarding Kathy part of the appreciation in 
value, during the marriage, of certain assets which was disre-
garded by the trial court" in light of its award to Kathy of an 
interest in the Western General Dairy facility. (Respondents 
Brief in the appeal from the Divorce Decree at 21.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
(1) The property encumbered by Kathy*s lis pendens 
was improved during the marriage with marital assets and 
appreciated during the marriage of the parties. The lower 
court failed to award Kathy an interest in said real property 
but instead, awarded her an interest in other real property 
acquired by the parties during the marriage known as the 
Western General Dairy facility in Bountiful, Utah. Robert has 
appealed that portion of the divorce decree granting Kathy an 
interest in the dairy facility. If Robert is successful on 
appeal, the court, on remand, may grant Kathy an interest in 
the real property encumbered by the lis pendens to compensate 
her for loss of her present interest in the dairy facility. 
Because these proceedings may be finally resolved with Kathy 
having an interest in the real property encumbered by the lis 
pendens, she should be able to give notice of said claim to 
protect herself against good faith purchasers who may acquire 
an interest therein. Judge Cornaby's order should therefor be 
reversed. 
(2) At the end of the divorce trial, the lower court 
specifically found that Robert was the alter ego of three 
corporations operated by him during the marriage. One of those 
corporations holds record title to the real property encumbered 
by Kathy's lis pendens. As part of the Divorce Decree, Kathy 
was given a judgment against Robert for $40,293.00. If Kathy 
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is ordered to release the lis pendens presently of record, she 
should be allowed to record a new lis pendens giving notice 
that Robert is the true owner of the real property titled in 




THE LIS PENDENS SHOULD REMAIN DURING THE 
PENDENCY OF THESE PROCEEDINGS TO GIVE NOTICE 
TO GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-40-2 (1953) provides for the 
recording of a lis pendens where litigation affects title to 
real property as follows: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the com-
plaint or thereafter, and the defendant at 
the time of filing his answer when affirma-
tive relief is claimed in such answer, or at 
any time afterward, may file for record with 
the recorder of the county in which the 
property or some part thereof is situated a 
notice of the pendency of the action, con-
taining the names of the parties, the object 
of the action or defense, and a description 
of the property in that county affected 
thereby. From the time of filing such 
notice for record only shall a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property affected 
thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice of the pendency of the action, and 
only of its pendency against parties desig-
nated by their real names. 
In commenting upon this section of the Utah Code, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the sole purpose for recording 
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a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of the pendency of 
litigation to all persons who may be interested in acquiring an 
interest in real property affected thereby. Hansen v. Kohler, 
550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976); Bovce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 
1980) . Recordation of a notice of lis pendens does not create 
any interest in real property but merely gives notice of a 
claim therein which may be resolved in pending litigation. 
(Id.) 
In the Hansen case, Hansen recorded a lis pendens on 
October 19, 1971. Hansen was unaware that the real property 
covered by the lis pendens had been conveyed to a third party 
and that the deed had been recorded on October 18, 1971--one 
day prior to recordation of the lis pendens. Because the lis 
pendens was recorded after the deed conveying such real prop-
erty to a third party, it was ineffective, and the defendant 
sought damages against Hansen for slander of title. In holding 
that Hansen had an absolute privilege to record the lis 
pendens, even though his claim may have been defeated by a 
prior recorded deed to a good faith purchaser, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated at 189-90 as follows: 
The contention of Hansen is the recording of 
the lis pendens was privileged; and, there-
fore, Pierce had no claim for slander of 
title. This contention is well made. 
Restatement of Torts, Section 638: 
A party to a private litigation . . . has an 
absolute privilege to disparage another's 
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property in or the quality of his land, 
chattels, or intangible things in the insti-
tutution of or during the course and as a 
part of a judicial proceeding in which he 
participates if the disparagement has some 
correlation thereto. 
Comment C. of Section 638, refers to the 
Comment of Section 587, wherein it is 
stated, at page 231: 
a. The privilege stated in this 
section is based upon the public 
interest in according to all men the 
utmost freedom of access to the courts 
of justice for the settlement of their 
private disputes. Like the privilege 
of an attorney, it is absolute. It 
protects a party to a private litiga-
tion or a private prosecutor in a 
criminal prosecution from a liability 
for defamation irrespective of his 
purpose in publishing the defamatory 
matter, of his belief in its truth or 
even his knowledge of its falsity. One 
against whom civil or criminal proceed-
ings are initiated may recover in an 
action for the wrongful initiation of 
the proceedings, under the rule stated 
in § 674 to 680, if the proceedings 
have terminated in his favor and were 
initiated without probable cause and 
for an improper purpose. 
The sole purpose of recording a notice of 
lis pendens is to give constructive notice 
of the pendency of the proceeding; its only 
foundation is the action filed — it has no 
existence independent of it. Our statute 
authorizing the use of lis pendens, con-
cludes by saying, HFrom the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or an encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names.*1 
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The clear weight of authority describing the 
office of a lis pendens is well stated in 
Albertson v. Raboff, wherein the court 
reasoned that since the effect of a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of 
all the facts apparent on the face of the 
pleadings, the recordation of a notice of 
lis pendens is, in effect, a republication 
of the pleadings. Since the publication of 
the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the 
republication thereof by recording a notice 
of lis pendens is similarly privileged. The 
court said: 
. . . It would be anomalous to hold 
that a litigant is privileged to make a 
publication necessary to bring an 
action but that he can be sued for 
defamation if he lets anyone know that 
he has brought it, [citation omitted] 
particularly where he is expressly 
authorized by statute to let all the 
world know that he has brought it. . . 
[At page 409 of 295 P.2d.] 
In the instant action, Hansen's 
recordation of a lis pendens was absolutely 
privileged and the action of Pierce for 
slander of title cannot be sustained. . . . 
In the present case, Kathy showed at the trial that 
the real property located at 251 Edith Avenue and 1248 South 
300 East was in fact owned by Robert during the marriage, that 
substantial improvements were made to such real property during 
the marriage from marital assets, that substantial appreciation 
to the property resulted during the marriage and that even 
though record title to said real property was in the name of an 
entity or person other than Robert, he continued to control and 
manage the same and make all decisions with respect thereto. 
On appeal, Robert seeks to have the property distribution made 
-10-
by the trial court modified, resulting in reduction of Kathy1s 
interest in the dairy facility. If Robert is successful, Kathy 
should be awarded an interest in the Salt Lake real property to 
compensate her for any reduction in her share of the Bountiful 
dairy property. Her claim is based on appreciation of those 
assets during the marriage, equitable title to said real prop-
erty being in Robert, and the improvements made thereto with 
marital assets which increased their value. In light of these 
claims, recordation of a lis pendens is appropriate and Kathy 
should not be ordered to remove the same. 
POINT II 
A LIS PENDENS ON THE SALT LAKE PROPERTIES IS 
APPROPRIATE TO REFLECT HER INTEREST THEREIN 
BY WAY OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT 
The lower court specifically found in the Divorce 
Decree and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
Robert was the alter ego of Fun Fair, Inc., JOC, Inc. and Load 
Alert, Inc. and that to observe those corporate entities in 
these divorce proceedings would work an injustice as follows: 
There was a unity of interest and 
ownership between defendant and Fun Fair, 
Inc., JOC, Inc. and Load Alert, Inc. such 
that the separate personalities of defendant 
and those corporations no longer existed and 
such corporations were, in fact, the alter 
egos of defendant. The observance of the 
corporate form of those corporations in 
these proceedings would promote an injustice 
and result in inequity in division of the 
marital estate between defendant and plain-
tiff. The income, assets, business and 
debts of such corporations were managed and 
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cared for as if they were defendant's per-
sonal assets, business and obligations. 
Paragraph 6 of the Amended Conclusions of Law and paragraph 5 
of the Amended Decree of Divorce. 
As part of the Decree of Divorce Kathy was given a 
judgment against Robert for $40,293.00. Amended Decree of 
Divorce at paragraph 11. If Kathy is ordered to release the 
lis pendens presently of record, she should be allowed to 
record a new lis pendens giving notice that Robert is the real 
owner of the real property titled in the name of Fun Fair, Inc. 
and that the $40,293.00 judgment constitutes a lien thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1953). 
It is anticipated that Robert will argue at the hear-
ing in this matter that he is entitled to release of the lis 
pendens and damages as against Kathy in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-40-4 (1953) as follows: 
If the plaintiff shows a right to recover at 
the time the action was commenced, but it 
appears that his right has terminated during 
the pendency of the action, the verdict and 
judgment must be according to the fact, and 
the plaintiff may recover damages for with-
holding the property. 
This provision of the Utah Code is wholly irrevelant in this 
situation. That section has to do with quieting title to real 
property where the plaintiff claims some right, title or 
interest therein. If it is determined that the plaintiff had 
no interest in said real property then damages may be awarded 
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for wrongfully withholding said real property. In this action, 
Kathy does not have possession of said real property and she is 
not wrongfully withholding the same. All she has done is 
record a notice of lis pendens indicating that because of these 
divorce proceedings she may be awarded an interest in said real 
property. As set forth above, she is absolutely privileged in 
recording said lis pendens and no damages should result there-
from in favor of Robert. If Kathy were required to release her 
lis pendens at this point, she would have no way of notifying 
persons seeking to acquire an interest in said real property of 
her claim. In that situation, her claim would evaporate if 
said real property were sold to a bona fide purchaser, without 
notice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Kathy respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse Judge Cornaby's Order Removing Lis 
Pendens and deny Robert's motion regarding the same. 
DATED this \b day of \^\U^\x:i^ 1986. 
JL'<tJ!Ikt\ r, A^w74i 
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON 
D. R. CHAMBERS 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Kathleen S. Pusey 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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